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FETAL EXPERIMENTATION AND
FEDERAL REGULATION
DENNIS

I.

J.

HORANt

INTRODUCTION

The recommendations of the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research'
(Commission) were substantially incorporated by the Secretary of the
Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) into the rules
and regulations2 governing the grants and contracts made by HEW
supporting research, development, and related activities involving the
fetus, pregnant women, and human in vitro fertilization.' Significantly,
the HEW regulations concerning the fetus and in vitro fertilization are
part of an overall scheme of research regulation involving the "Protection of Human Subjects," 4 although no regulations exist as yet
5
concerning in vitro fertilization.
Although the Commission's recommendations were generally followed by the Secretary of HEW in the regulations, there were areas
t Lecturer in Law, University of Chicago Law School. Vice Chairman, American Bar Association Medicine and Law Committee. Member of the Illinois Bar.
B.S., Loyola University, Chicago, 1957; J.D., Loyola, University School of Law,
Chicago, 1963.
1. NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE PROTECTION -OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS: RESEARCH ON
THE FETUS (DHEW Publication No. (OS) 76-127, 1975), also printed in 40 Fed. Reg.
33,530 (1975) (partially codified in 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.101-.301 (1976)) [hereinafter
cited as COMMISSION'S REPORT]. For the reader's convenience, chapters VIII and IX
of the Commission's Report are reprinted in this symposium at pp. 300-24, and unless
otherwise indicated, all citations to the Commission's Report refer to these pages.

See also

NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BioMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, Appendix to REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

RESEARCH ON THE FETUS (DHEW Publication No. (OS) 76-128, 1975) [hereinafter cited as Appendix]. The Appendix contains the entire text of papers and reports
that were prepared for the Commission, and certain other materials that were reviewed
by the Commission during its deliberations.

2. 45 C.F.R. § 46.101-.301 (1976).
3. Id. § 46.201-.301.
4. Id. § 46.101-.301 (emphasis added). The policy of the regulations is stated
to be in part: "safeguarding the rights and welfare of subjects at risk in activities
supported under grants and contracts from DHEW." Id. § 46.102. The regulations
provide protective procedures for DHEW grants similar to those required by the
Food and Drug Administration. See 21 C.F.R. § 361.1(d) (s) (1976).
5. In vitro fertilization is defined in the regulations as "any fertilization of
human ova which occurs outside the body of a female, either through admixture of
donor human sperm and ova or by any other means." 45 C.F.R. § 46.203(g) (1976).
According to the Secretary of DHEW, no regulations govern in vitro fertilization
"[b]ecause biomedical research is not yet near the point of being able to maintain
for a substantial period the non-implanted product of in vitro fertilization . . ..
Given the state of research, we believe that regulation would be premature." 40 Fed.

Reg. 33,527 (1975).
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of disagreement.' Therefore, the regulations themselves rather than
the recommendations of the Commission govern fetal experimentation
under HEW contracts. Even though the prestige of the Commission
adds great weight to its recommendations and, indeed, in public debate
may be dispositive of fetal experimentation issues to many, it should
be remembered that the Commission's regulations concern fetal experimentation only in the narrow area of contract grants under HEW.
This observation is significant, since statutory and case law, although
influenced by the regulations and the recommendations of the Commission, may develop in different and contrary directions. These developments could in turn cause substantial future changes in the regulations.
Consequently, this article will confine itself primarily to a discussion
of the regulations themselves, with special emphasis placed upon the
deficiencies of the regulations.
In spite of such deficiencies, however, one cannot help but be
impressed by the work of the Commission, given the present status of
the fetus under the decision of the United States Supreme Court in
Roe v. Wade. 7 Maintaining an attitude of dignity and respect for the
fetus in the face of that opinion is not only a difficult task but often
schizophrenic and unrealistic." Yet the Commission has maintained
such an attitude and, through its prestige, has transferred that attitude
of dignity and respect to these regulations. This is an accomplishment
worthy of our note. If the recommendations of the Commission or
the regulations themselves fall short of what fetal protection should
be under our Constitution, neither the Commission nor the Secretary
of HEW are entirely to blame (with certain exceptions, such as the
status of the fetus ex utero). They have done, if not the best that can
be done, at least something that is not unworthy of our praise: they
have raised the value of fetal life above that accorded it by the United
States Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade. This accomplishment should
not be forgotten as the balance of this article is read.
6. See, e.g., 40 Fed. Reg. 33,528 (1975) for the comments of the Assistant
Secretary of Health concerning activities directed toward the fetus ex utero. Noting
that the Commission recommended that no procedures be applied to a nonviable fetus
ex utero which would alter its duration of life, the Assistant Secretary was persuaded
that an exception was necessary in the public interest because experimentation on the
nonviable fetus ex utero had contributed substantially to the ability of physicians to
bring to viability increasingly small fetuses. Id.

7. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
8. In his dissenting statement, Commissioner David Louisell pointed out with
respect to the effect of Roe v. Wade on fetal experimentation: "Little wonder. that
intelligent people are asking: how can one [the fetus] who has no right to life itself
have the lesser right of precluding experimentation on his or her person?" CoM-

ZilssXON's REPORT, supra note 1, at 316.
9. See text accompanying notes 71-78 infra.
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II.

327

DEFINITIONAL DIFFICULTIES

The regulations create several troublesome definitional problems.
Some of the concepts contained in the definitional section of the regulations were adopted from the definitions used by the Commission,1"
but with certain substantial differences."
For example, the regulations define the term "pregnancy" as the
period of time from confirmation of implantation until expulsion or
extraction of the fetus.' However, such a definition of pregnancy is
scientifically incomplete at best; pregnancy presumably begins at the
time of fertilization.' 3 For purposes of regulations concerning fetal
experimentation, the fact that such a definition is incorrect or incomplete
may be unimportant, since experimentation cannot take place prior to
implantation. However, since these regulations are supposedly designed
to include in vitro fertilization,' 4 that observation misses the point. Although the purpose for excluding the time between conception and implantation from the regulations is never made explicit, it appears obvious
that the purpose is to ensure that nothing contained in the regulations
interferes with current methods of contracepting even though certain
current methods may also be abortifacient prior to implantation.' 5
The Commission admitted that certain of its definitions differed
from medical, legal, or common usage but argued that these changes
were adopted in the interest of clarity or to conform to the language
used in the legislative mandate.' 6 There is certainly nothing surprising
10. Compare 45 C.F.R. § 46.203 (1976) with COMMISSION'S REPORT, supra note 1,
at 40 Fed. Reg. 33,531-32 (1975). See generally 40 Fed. Reg. 33,526 (1975) (comments
of Assistant Secretary of Health).
11. For example, the Commission defined "fetus" as the human from the time of

implantation until a determination is made that the fetus is viable or possibly viable.
COMMISSION'S REPORT, supra note 1, at 40 Fed. Reg. 33,531 (1975). The Commission
then stated: "If it is viable or possibly viable, it is thereupon designated an infant."
Id. (emphasis added). The regulations, on the other hand, use the term "product of
conception" instead of "human" in defining the fetus and omit the reference to a
possibly viable fetus being considered an infant. 45 C.F.R. § 46.203(e) (1976). A
better understanding of the differences between the Commission and DHEW could
be reached by minutely comparing the concepts and recommendations of the one with
the other. However, that is a task beyond the purview of this article.
12. 45 C.F.R. § 46.203(b) (1976). The Commission's report contained no definition of pregnancy.
13. See R. RUGH & L. SBETTLES, FROM CONCEPTION TO BIRTH 17-26 (1971).
After describing the creation of the new "individuals" id. at 20, and referring to this
individual as an "embryo" even before implantation, id. at 26, the authors continue to
depict the various stages of embryo development, concluding that "[a] It of this occurs
before a woman could possibly be certain that she is pregnant." Id. at 25. See
generally M. GILBERT, BIOGRAPHY OF THE UNBORN (1963).
14. See note 5 supra.
15. See generally Hilgers, The Intrauterine Device, Contraceptive or Abortifacient', 57 MINN. MED. 493 (1974); note 19 infra.
16. COMMISSION'S REPORT, supra note 1, at 40 Fed. Reg. 33,531 (1975).
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about an attempt to make analysis of ethical problems more accurate
by making language rho're "clear. However, one must ask how clear or
accurate the ethical conclusions can be if the definitional beginnings of
the study are scientifically inaccurate.- Thus, if one defines the ethical
problem to exclude the most difficult area of that problem, one prejudges at least a portion of the result. For example, by excluding
from the definition of pregnancy the area between conception and implantation, has not the Commission and HEW legitimated in vitro
fertilization by defining it, as an.area involving the nonhuman?
Ethical considerations were a primary concern of the Commis17
sion.
However, ethical considerations must begin with scientific
reality and should ignore the polarization of science which has occurred
since the beginning of the abortion debate."8 Prior to that debate and
the subsequent polarization it was clear that individual human life
began at conception and that medical science defined pregnancy as
17. As part of its deliberations, the Commission considered the papers of nine
ethicists. See Appendix, supra. note 1,at 2-1 to 10-26. These papers Sre summarized
in CoMIssIoN's REPORT, supra note 1, at 40 Fed. Reg. 33,537-40 (1975).
18. One commentator has given the following example of the polarization of
science in response to the abortion debate:
In January and February, 1962, Guttmacher was sent by the Population
Council and the International Planned Parenthood Federation to study conception
control around the world. When he returned to New York, he advised the
Population Council that the, "best chance for immediate success lay in work
with intrauterine contraception," an astounding suggestion from the same man
who only 3 years previously had soundly condemned such practice.
In [the Second International Conference on Intrauterine Contraceptioni discussion was begun on the abortifacient capability of IUD's. Candidly expressing
that an abortifacient label would be detrimental to promoting the device in underdeveloped countries like Pakistan, where abortion is strongly opposed, the population planners began to redefine abortion and pregnancy.
In considering redefinition, the likelihood that IUD's destroy blastocysts prior
to implantation led the planners to consider defining the blastocyst out of existence. Pregnancy, they said, should be redefined to begin at implantation. It seems
that all subsequent scientific conferences on the "Preimplantation Stages of
Pregnancy" were to be considered mere fiction.
Later, a scientific group of the World Health Organization (WHO) gave
careful consideration to the proper name for these devices. After considering
such names as "intrauterine foreign body" (IUFB), "intrauterine contraceptive
device" (IUCD), and "intrauterine device" (IUD), they unanimously accepted the name "intrauterine device" (IUD) with the recommendation that it
be universally used in the medical literature. However, most articles in the
literature, written primarily through grants from the Ford Foundation and the
Population Council, have ignored this recommendation and continued to use intrauterine contraceptive device. This rhetorical ploy is in direct contradiction to the
mounting scientific evidence that the principal mode of action of the IUD as a
"contraceptive device" is not the prevention of conception but, rather, the destruction of the human blastocyst prior to implantation.
Hilgers, The intrauterine Device: Contraceptive or Abortifacient?, 5 MARR. & FAM.
NEWSLETTER 3 (1974)
(footnotes omitted) (can be obtained by writing P.O. Box 190,
Midnapore, Alberta, Canada).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol22/iss2/7

4

Horan: Fetal Experimentation and Federal Regulation

1976-1977]

FETAL RESEARCH

beginning at conception.1 9 Avoiding debate and confrontation by defining pregnancy as beginning with implantation may be "prudent,"
but it leads this reader of the Commission's Report and the Secretary
of HEW's regulations to question not only the results but the wisdom
of the entire proceedings.
Other definitional problems are equally troublesome. The definition of fetus excludes the viable fetus in the uterus.2" Consideration
for such a fetus falls within those regulations governing research on
pregnant women 2 1 or fetuses in utero.2' These definitions imply that

a viable fetus in utero does not have the same legal standing as the
viable fetus ex utero. This line of reasoning appears to spring from
the misconception, contrary to much authority, that the fetus has no
standing in the law until it is born or expelled from the uterus.28
19. See L.B. AREY, DEVELOPMENTAL ANATOMY 55

(1965); J.

DAviEs, HUMAN

DEVELOPMENTAL ANATOMY 3 (1963); G.D. DODDs, ESSENTIALS OF HUMAN EMBRYOLOGY 2 (3d ed. 1946); A. INGLEMAN-SUNDBERG & C. WIRSEN, A CHILD IS BORN
(1965); J. LANGMAN, MEDICAL EMBRYOLOGY 3 (2d ed. 1969) ; B.M. PATTEN, HUMAN

EMBRYOLOGY 39 (3d ed. 1968); R. RUGH & L.B. SHETTLES, supra note 13; L.B.
SHETTLES, OVUM HUMANUM 60 (1960); Gordon, Genetical, Social, and Medical
Aspects of Abortion, 42 S. AFR. MED. J. 721 (1968); Quimby, Introduction to Medical
Jurisprudence:Address Delivered at the Thirty-Eighth Annual Meeting of the A.M.A.,
June 10, 1887, 9 J.A.M.A. 161 (1887).
20. "'Fetus' means the product of conception from the time of implantation until
a determination is made, following expulsion or extraction of the fetus, that it is
viable." 45 C.F.R. § 46.203(c) (1976).
21. Id. § 46.207.
22. Id. § 46.208.
23. The tort cases for wrongful death provide an excellent example of the debate
surrounding this issue. At the time of the Roe v. Wade decision, a distinct majority
of courts allowed an action for the wrongful death of the fetus. Annot., 15 A.L.R.3d
992 (1967). The Wade court paid scant attention to these authorities, dismissing
them as representing the vindication only of the rights of the survivors (the parents).
410 U.S. at 162. However, Professor John Hart Ely has noted: "To the extent they
are not entirely inconclusive, the bodies of doctrine to which the Court adverts respecting the protection of fetuses under general legal doctrine tend to undercut rather than
support its conclusion." Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v.
Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 925 (1973) (footnote omitted). Four state supreme courts
since Roe v. Wade have created a cause of action for the viable unborn child. Eich
v. Town of Gulf Shores, 293 Ala. 95, 300 So. 2d 354 (1974); Chrisafogeorgis v.
Brandenburg, 55 111. 2d 368, 304 N.E.2d 88 (1973) ; Mone v. Greyhound Lines, Inc.,
331 N.E.2d 916 (1975); Libbee v. Permanene Clinic, 268 Ore. 258,
____Mass. _,
518 P.2d 636 (1974).
It is frequently argued that these cases do' not represent a legal right in the
child itself, but only vindication of the right of the parents or of the survivor. This
argument is clearly erroneous since in order for the action to exist the unborn child
must be found to be a "person" within the meaning of that word as used in the wrongful death statute. Once the court has so found, then the right which accrues to the
unborn child is identical to the right which accrues to any adult for whom the same
cause of action might exist. The conclusion is inescapable: the unborn viable child is
a bearer in its own right of legal personhood for purposes of the wrongful death cause
of action. This proposition, although clearly the majority point of view in America,
is contrary to the constitutional interpretation of Justice Blackmun in Roe v. Wade
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Fortunately, the regulations give the maximum of protection to
the fetus in utero, in that it may not be subject to any experimentation
not directed at its particular health needs with one exception. 24 The
exception allows experimentation on the fetus in utero which is not
for the health needs of the particular fetus if the risk is "minimal" and
the purpose of the experiment is the development of important biomedical knowledge which cannot be obtained by other means.25
The term "minimal risk" is not defined in the regulations. The
chief proponent of proxy consent, 26 Reverend Richard A. McCormick,
S.J., urged the Commission, if it accepted proxy consent, to limit the
experimentations where proxy consent was acceptable to those which
hold "no discernible risk." 7 There is probably a difference between
the terms "no discernible risk" and "minimal risk"; however, neither
the regulations nor the Commission Report makes any such distinction.28
The most troublesome definition of all is that which creates the
new category of subhuman: the nonviable fetus or fetus ex utero.29
This new creature will be discussed separately below."
III.

In vitro

FERTILIZATION:

A

SEPARATE MORAL PROBLEM

According to a statement made by the Secretary of HEW, in vitro
fertilization is excluded from the scope of the regulations "because
biomedical research is not yet near the point of being able to maintain
for a substantial period the non-implanted product of such fertilization."'" Regulation 46.204(e) requires that proposals involving in vitro
fertilization be first reviewed by the Ethical Advisory Board, which
for it indicates that legal personhood (and, in my opinion, constitutional personhood)
begins en ventre sa mere.
The Supreme Court's argument is additionally flawed since it would be unnecessary to consider viability at all if the action were merely to vindicate the parent.
This is because viability is a concept which concerns the developmental qualities of
the unborn child itself in terms of its capacity to sustain its own life outside the
womb. Indeed, it would be contradictory to make use of the concept of viability if
an action in wrongful death were only for the vindication of the parent, since the
parent presumably wants the child, indeed loves the child, as much one week before
viability as one week after. For further discussion of wrongful death actions involving fetuses, see 21 VILL. L. REv. 994-1005 (1976).

24. 45 C.F.R. § 46.208 (1976).
25. Id. at § 46.208(a) (2).
26. See text accompanying notes 43-68 supra.
27. Appendix, supra note 1, at 5-9 through 5-10.

28. Commissioner Karen Lebacqz raised the minimal risk issue in her separate
statement: "[T]he interpretation of risk and the designation of acceptable 'minimal
risk' merit considerable attention by the scientific community and the lay public."
COMMISSION'S REPORT, supra note 1, at 321.

29. 45 C.F.R. § 46.203(e) (1976).
30. See text accompanying notes 71-78 infra.
31. 40 Fed. Reg. 33,527 (1975) (emphasis added).
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must render advice as to the acceptability of the proposal from "an
ethical standpoint. '3 2 Since there are no other regulations governing
in vitro fertilization, it is impossible to determine what the "ethical
standpoint" might be.
The lack of clarity in the regulations becomes manifest when one
considers that the use of the words "substantial period" by the Secretary of HEW implies the lack of any ethical standard. That is to say,
the statement of the Secretary of HEW implies that, although biomedical research can fertilize the egg and sperm in vitro and create
a new living organism, that new living organism can currently survive
only for a short period of time; consequently, the problem is of insufficient consequence to warrant drafting regulations. The fact that the
new living organism is human is apparently irrelevant.
For some, this approach creates significant moral problems. Can
in vitro fertilization ever be moral when we know beforehand that the
product of such conception must be destroyed? The answer is obviously
3
no. Those who have accepted the theory of delayed hominization'
could perhaps answer that question in the affirmative as long as the
new being's lifespan was less than that which would involve infanticide.
In a recent review of this question, Benedict Ashley concluded that
"according to present biological knowledge, theories of delayed hominization lack any solid empirical evidence. ' ' 4 If this is so, in vitro
fertilization without a reasonable prospect of maintaining the new life
to maturity must be considered to be immoral experimentation. Experimentation with in vitro fertilization, which is implicitly allowed
by the regulation - albeit subject to some ethical restraints - should
be stopped.
IV.

ANOTHER SEPARATE MORAL PROBLEM
ETHICAL ADVISORY BOARDS

The regulations create two separate Ethical Advisory Boards.8 5
One is to advise the Public Health Service, while the other is to
advise all other agencies and components within HEW. These boards
32. 45 C.F.R. § 46.204(e) (1976).
33. Donceel, Immediate Animation and Delayed Hominization, 31 THEOLOGICAL

STUD. 76 (1970). The term "delayed hominization" as used by Donceel refers to the
Thomistic principle that the human soul can only inform matter sufficiently prepared
for it. Id. In order to be prepared, Donceel argues that the human matter must be
sufficiently differentiated into organs, including the cerebral cortex, the site of the
human animal's highest activity. Id.
34. Ashley, A Critique of Delayed Hominization,in POPE JOHN XXIII MEDICAL,MORAL RESEARCH AND EDUCATION CENTER, AN ETHICAL EVALUATION OP FETAL
EXPERIMENTATION

113, at 128 (D. McCarthy & A. Moraczewski, eds., 1976).

35. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.204 (1976).
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are to be staffed so that they are competent to deal with medical, legal,
social, ethical and related issues. They may include research scientists,
physicians, sociologists, educators, lawyers and ethicists as well as members of the general public.8 6
These Ethical Advisory Boards "shall render advice consistent
with the policies and requirements of this Part as to ethical issues...
raised by individual applications or proposals." 7 Thus, the question
arises as to whether someone can serve on an Ethical Advisory Board
who might, even on occasion, render advice inconsistent with those
policies and requirements. Do the regulations mean, for example, that
persons who consider in vitro fertilization morally wrong may not sit on
such an Ethical Advisory Board, since the regulations implicitly allow
such experimentation? On the other hand, if it is true that the persons
who sit on the Ethical Advisory Boards must agree with the ethical
orientation of the regulations, then most right-to-life advocates have
been effectively eliminated from such Ethical Advisory Boards, as have
those persons who agree with the ethical positions of Joseph Fletcher.88
Professor David Louisell has stated dissenting views to two of
the recommendations made by the National Commission.8" His primary
concern was with that part of the National Commission's Report which
allows experimentation on what is now called the nonviable fetus
ex utero but which up to now has been known as a premature infant.
The regulations allow experimentation on the nonviable fetus ex utero,
even to the extent of altering duration of life.4" Are we to presume,
then, that persons with convictions similar to those expressed by Professor Louisell are to be either automatically excluded from participating
in the activities of the Ethical Advisory Boards or obligated to exclude
themselves voluntarily, since their advice could not be consistent with
the mandate stated in the regulations? If so, then I must withdraw
my praise of the Commission and Secretary of HEW,4 since, despite
arguments to the contrary 2 with which I agree, it once again has become evident that the abortion issue cannot be entirely separated from
the fetal experimentation issue. These dilemmas emphasize the ultimate necessity for a constitutional amendment vesting the constitutional
36. Id.
37. Id. § 46.204(c) (emphasis added). The reference to "this Part" means Part
46 of the Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.), "Protection of Human Subjects."
38. For a discussion of the ethical views of Joseph Fletcher, see text accompanying notes 141-43 infra.
39. CoMmissioN's REPORT, supra note 1, at 315.
40. 45 C.F.R. § 46.209(b) (1976).
41. See text accompanying notes 7 & 8 supra.
42. P. RAMSEY, THE ETHICS OF FETAL RESEARCH xvi (1975).
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right to life at the time of conception without such gaps as have been
created by Roe v. Wade.
V.

CONSENT AND INFORMED CONSENT

The federal regulations place the burden of monitoring the consent
process with the Institutional Review Boards. 43 The regulations refer
to monitoring the "actual consent process." '4 4 This choice of words
could not be more apt. Consent, unless it is an informed consent, is
meaningless in both the legal and the ethical sense. Of all aspects of
clinical investigation, informed consent has been the most severely
criticized ;45 of all problems in the area of fetal46 research, the question
of consent is said to be the "thorniest problem."
Justice Cardozo said: concerning the necessity for obtaining consent for any treatment, "Every human being of adult years and sound
mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body;
and a surgeon who performs an operation without his patient's consent
commits an assault, for which he is liable in damages." 47 In an earlier
case, relied upon by Justice Cardozo, an Illinois appellate court had
been called upon to answer the same question. 48 After noting that not
a single case could be found in the English or American reports where
a surgeon had been held liable for performing an operation without
consent, the court nonetheless stated:
On the contrary, under free government at least, the free citizen's
first and greatest right, which underlies all others - the right
to the inviolability of his person, in other words, his right to himself - is the subject of universal acquiescence, and this right
necessarily forbids a physician or surgeon, however skillful or
eminent, who has been asked to examine, diagnose, advise and
prescribe (which are at least necessary first steps in treatment and
care), to violate without permission the bodily integrity of his
patient by a major or capital operation, placing him under anaesthetics for that purpose, and operating on him without his consent
or knowledge.4 9
43. 45 C.F.R. §46.205(a) (2) (1976).
44. Id.
45. Tiefel, The Cost of Fetal Research: Ethical Considerations, 294 NEw ENG.

J. MED. 85, 87 (1976).
46. Note, Fetal Experimentation: Moral, Legal and Medical Implications, 26
STAN. L. Rav. 1191 (1974).

47. Schloendorf v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129-30, 105 N.E. 92,
93 (1914).
300, 79 N.E. 562 (1906).
App. 161 (1905), aff'd, 224 Ill.
48. Pratt v. Davis, 118 Ill.
49. Id.
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Not only must the consent be obtained, but it must also be a free
and voluntary consent based upon a knowledge and understanding of
the risks involved. That is to say, the consent must be an informed
consent or it is no consent at all.5" Nondisclosure of a material risk
can never be justified in experimental therapy unless an emergency
exists.
No one disputes the application of these laudable principles to
him or herself. They have been disputed, however, when applied to
children 5 ' or the unborn.52 Except in extreme emergencies, therapists
or medical practitioners cannot act without the consent of the patient
or legal guardian.5 8 Many state statiites indicate that the consent of
only one parent is necessary.54 However, a parent may not withhold
consent to medical treatment for a child where that treatment is necessary to preserve the child's life. 5
It must be clearly understood that the law does not allow a
parent to give consent for medical intervention on behalf of a child
unless such intervention is for the child's benefit. Consequently, a
parent may not consent to nonbeneficial treatment such as clinical
research or nontherapeutic experimentation, even when the risk is
minimal. Indeed, this is so even if there is no discernible risk whatsoever. However, the law is not concerned with de minimus or merely
technical wrongs which cause no injury. Therefore clinical research or
experimentation in which there is no discernible risk is still a legal
wrong because of the impropriety of the consent, but it is a wrong without practical redress since there is no harm.
If harm occurs during nontherapeutic research on the child, then
the consent is vitiated. Parental consent, no matter how informed,
will not protect an investigator from liability if a child is injured in
the course of nontherapeutic research. This is because the injury is
to the child, not the parents. Their consent will only mean that recovery
to them personally may be barred. Thus, there is no such thing in the
law as proxy consent for nontherapeutic experimentation involving
children. The Commissioners and the Secretary of HEW are laboring
50. See Horan, Authority for Medical Treatment: Consent, in ILLINOIS INSTITUTE
7-1 through 7-31 (1975).
51. Duff & Campbell, Moral and Ethical Dilemmas in the Special-Care Nursery,
289 NEW ENG. J. MED. 890 (1973).
52. Fletcher, Fetal Research: An Ethical Appraisal, in Appendix, supra note 1,
at 3-1.
53. See, e.g., Zoski v. Gaines, 271 Mich. 1, 260 N.W. 99 (1935). See generally
W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 102 (4th ed. 1971) ; J. WALTZ & F. INBAU, MEDICAL JuRIsPRUDENCE 179-202 (1971).
54. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 91, § 18.2 (1961).
55. See, e.g., Wallace v. Labrenze, 411 Ill. 618, 104 N.E.2d 769 (1952).
OF CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION: MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
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under a misconception of the state of the law if they think otherwise. 6
In short, "a child is not the property of its parents and may not be
dealt with without regard for his best interests." 57 Professor Paul
Freund has said that "[t]he law here is that parents may consent
for the child if the invasion of the child's body is for the child's welfare
or benefit."' 58 Similarly the United States Supreme Court has stated
that "[p]arents may be free to become martyrs themselves. But it
does not follow that they are free, in identical circumstances, to make
martyrs of their children. . .. 9

In the words of Chief Justice Warren E. Burger:
No adult has the legal power to consent to experiments on an
infant unless the treatment is for the benefit of the infant. .

.

.It

is the lamentable use in experiments of such subjects as infant
children, incompetents in mental institutions, unconsenting soldiers
subject to military discipline -

as has been done -

that is inde-

fensible; and no rational social order will or should tolerate it.60

Those few cases which have allowed parents to consent on behalf of
children for donor transplants of kidneys or tissue to a brother or sister
have rationalized the consent either on the basis of an insignificant
invasion of the donor minor or the psychological benefit to the donor
in saving a brother or sister's life."1 Under no circumstances could
56. In fact, of those few courts which have addressed the subject of experimental
medical procedures done for the patient's own benefit, some have held that there is a
cause of action in strict liability for any injury sustained during such experimentation. See Carpenter v. Blake, 60 Barb. ch. 488 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1871) ; J. WALTZ & F.
INBAU, supra note 53, at 183-84. But see Brown v. Hughes, 30 P.2d 259 (Colo. 1934) ;
Fortner v. Koch, 272 Mich. 273, 261 N.W. 762 (1935). It would follow, then, that if the
purpose of the procedure is not to benefit the person upon whom it is performed, a
cause of action in strict liability would exist.
57. Morse, Legal Implications of Clinical Investigations, 20 VAND. L. REv. 747,
754 (1967).
58. Freund, Ethical Problems in Human Experimentation, 273 NEw ENG. J.
MED. 687, 691 (1965).
59. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (conviction of Jehovah's Witnesses for furnishing their minor children with materials to be sold in public places,
in violation of state law forbidding such sale, held not violative of first or fourteenth amendments).
60. Burger, Reflections of Law and Experimental Medicine, 15 U.C.L.A. L. REV.
436, 438 (1968) (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted).
61. Such consents are sometimes referred to as "substituted judgments." This
doctrine has been used to substantiate the consent of a parent for the donation of an
organ by an incompetent to an ill brother. Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky.
1969). In Strunk, the court reasoned that giving consent for the removal of the
kidney of the incompetent brother was for that brother's benefit since the brother's
death due to inability to obtain a donor would have had a traumatizing effect on the
incompetent. Id. at 146. In addition, the risk to the donor was determined to be
minimal, estimated at approximately 0.07 percent. Id. at 149. The dissent vigorously
disagreed. Id. It is obviously wrong, however, to extend that doctrine to allow a
parent to give consent for nontherapeutic experimentation upon a child. Legal authorities seem to agree. See, e.g., Grad, Legislative Responses to the New Biology: Limits
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those cases be stretched to provide support for the proposition that
parents have the right of consent to nontherapeutic medical procedures
on their children.
If parents may not consent to nontherapeutic medical procedures
on their children, neither may they give such consent on behalf of their
unborn children regardless of whether a particular child is wanted or
not. In support of this statement, Hans Tiefel has stated:
Consent for such research may not be given for children - whom
fetuses most resemble - and should not be given for unborn
children either ...
An even stronger case can be made against harmful nontherapeutic research with abortion fetuses. Not only can such
experiments not rely on maternal consent in cases of induced abortions, since the pregnant woman refuses to become a mother, but
the assumption that the woman has the best interests of the fetus
at heart is weakened, though not necessarily excluded, by her
decision to end fetal life through abortion. More importantly,
abortions usually lead to the death of the fetus, to an induced
death in a case of induced abortion. That places abortion fetuses
in the special class of dying human beings. Therefore, they deserve not only the protection from non-necessary or non-beneficial
harm that we grant to children but also the additional respect
that we offer to the dying.62
The federal regulations agree that the fetus falls within the scope of
the protection accorded human subjects and even admonish those concerned "that no research be conducted or supported which fails to treat
' 63
the fetus with proper care and dignity.
Treating the fetus with proper care and dignity consistent with
its human genetic heritage means applying the same legal principles to
the developing child in the womb as are applied to the born child. The
legality of abortion is irrelevant to our considerations here. The fact
that a woman is able to decide to abort in consort with her physician
does not mean that the human being she bears has any less right to
and Possibilities,15 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 480, 499 n.58 (1968). Sanders, David & Dukeminier, Medical Advance and Legal Lag: Hemodialysis and Kidney Transplantation, 15 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 357, 389-90 (1968). For a discussion of the substituted
judgment doctrine and organ donation, see Robertson, Organ Donations by Incompetents and the Substituted Judgment Doctrine, 76 COLUm. L. REV. 48 (1976).
My greatest concern with the substituted judgment doctrine is its use in the
case of defective children whose parents refuse consent to necessary medical treatment. For a discussion of various legal theories to support court action in such
circumstances, see Baron, Botsford & Cole, Live Organ and Tissue Transplants from
Minor Donors in Massachusetts, 55 B.U. L. REv. 159 (1975).
62. Tiefel, supra note 45, at 87-88.
63. 40 Fed. Reg. 33,528 (1975) (prefatory remarks of Assistant Secretary for
Health, Theodore Cooper).
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the dignity of his or her person, or that the unborn human being may
be experimented upon merely because he or she is unwanted.
The working draft HEW report submitted for public comment on
November 16, 1973, stated these principles very well: "Respect for
the dignity of human life must not be compromised whatever the age,
circumstance, or expectation of life of the individual. Therefore, all
appropriate procedures providing protection for children as subjects in biomedical research must be applied with equal rigor and with
additional safeguards to the fetus." 64
However, the final federal regulations fall short of these standards.
Informed consent is required,6 5 but parents are allowed to consent to
experiments on the unborn which are not for the benefit of the particular fetus but rather benefit the class of fetuses of which he or she
may be a member. Although the risk must be minimal, the term
"minimal" is undefined and under certain circumstances is a comparative concept only. For example, section 46.207(a) says that the fetus
can be placed at risk only to the minimum extent necessary to meet
the health needs of the mother. 66 Yet the lesson of Roe v. Wade is
that the health needs of the mother are of such significance that no risk
to the fetus could supersede those needs; thus, "minimal risk" apparently includes death. Furthermore, where the fetus has been aborted
and thus is intended for death, it is obvious that permissive investigators"7 will interpret "minimal risk" in the light of ultimate death.
The term "minimal risk" should be more clearly defined or replaced
68
entirely with Richard McCormick's concept of "no discernible risk."
Section 46.208(b) allows the mother to consent to nontherapeutic experimentation on the fetus for the sake of biomedical knowledge
if 1) the father's identity or whereabouts cannot be reasonably ascertained, 2) the father is not available, or 3) the mother is a rape
victim. 69

However, such research is permitted only if the risk is

minimal.
All nontherapeutic research involving the unborn should be prohibited unless that research or experimentation is for the benefit of
the particular fetus involved. The same standards used to determine
the adequacy of parental consent for research on born children should
be applied to the unborn. Thus, no parent should be allowed to give
64. 38 Fed. Reg. 31,742 (1973).
65. 45 C.F.R. § 46.109 (1976).
66. Id. § 46.207.
67. For a discussion of permissive investigators, see text accompanying notes
130-37 infra.
68. For a discussion of the term "discernible risk," see text accompanying notes.
26-28 supra.
69. 45 C.F.R. § 46.208(b).
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consent to nontherapeutic research involving the unborn unless there
is no discernible risk involved. If the fetus is nevertheless injured, a
cause of action in strict liability against the researchers would be appro70
priate notwithstanding the consent.
VI.

A NEW

CATEGORY OF HUMAN

THE NONVIABLE FETUS

-

Ex Utero

Perhaps the greatest disservice to mankind caused by both the
National Commission's recommendations and HEW's regulations is
the creation of a new category of human being: the nonviable fetus
ex utero. One cannot be too hard on either body since the genesis of
the problem is the decision of the Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade
which made the unborn a nonperson under the Federal Constitution.
However, merely because the word "person" in the Federal Constitution
does not include the unborn, it is not necessarily true that the unborn
is not a legal person for other purposes. For example, in the case of
wrongful death actions the viable fetus has been determined to have
legal rights.

71

There has been an unwarranted assumption made that merely
because a woman has a constitutional right to abort, she therefore has
a mandate to kill the unborn. This does not follow. 72 The constitutional

rights of the mother under the Federal Constitution are supreme over
all and any state created rights of the fetus, but only where those rights
are in conflict. Where there is no conflict, the legal rights of the unborn
have equal weight with other legal rights. In the fetal experimentation
area no conflict exists between the constitutional right of a mother to
abort and the legal rights accorded a living, ex utero fetus. Consequently, a fetus born alive by either spontaneous or induced abortion
is a legal and constitutional person and is entitled to all the rights and
respect accorded to any person. If a fetus is dying because of nonviability, this does not mean it should be accorded less respect. 78 The
70. The Model Statute printed in Appendix A follows these principles.
71. See note 20 supra. For a survey of the legal rights which have been granted
the unborn, see Kindregan, Abortion, the Law, and Defective Children: A LegalMedical Study, 3 SUFFOLK L. REV. (1969). In many states the unborn's intestate

rights of succession to property vest immediately upon the death of the decedent,
subject to divestment if the child is not born alive. See, e.g., Tomlin v. Laws, 301 Ill.
616, 134 N.E. 24 (1922); Deal v. Septon, 144 N.C. 110, 56 S.E. 691 (1907).
72. We should remember that prior to the legalization of abortion by the U.S.
Supreme Court, some state abortion statutes allowed abortion to save the child's life.
See, e.g., 40A Minn. Stat. Ann. §§ 617.18, 617.19 (1964) (repealed 1974).
73. State legislatures are enacting laws to clarify these questions. For example,
in 1975 the state legislature of Illinois passed the 1975 Illinois Abortion Act, which
clearly stated that in all areas of the law where the rights of the unborn and the rights
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regulations, however, allow nontherapeutic experimentation on the
nonviable fetus ex utero, requiring merely that the parent or parents
give an informed consent. 74
In addition, the language of the regulations is dangerously ambiguous. For example, section 46.209 prohibits experimentation on the
fetus ex utero prior to the determination of viability unless there is no
"added risk" to the fetus. 75 Although there is no definition of fetus
ex utero in the regulations, the term "nonviable fetus" is defined in
section 46.203 (e) as a living, nonviable fetus ex utero.76 If the fetus
is nonviable, the limit placed upon experimentation is illusory, since by
definition the nonviable fetus is dying and no greater risk can be
added than death itself.
A dying fetus should be accorded the same dignity and respect
as a dying adult. It is odd indeed that at a time when there is such
a hue and cry to accord dignity to the dying adult, there should be so
little concern for the dying fetus.77 Professor Louisell in his dissent
to the Commission's Report puts the proposition very succinctly:
"Recommendation 6 concerns what is now called the 'nonviable fetus
of the mother are not in conflict, the unborn child is a legal person from the time of
conception. The statute reads:
Section 1. It is the intention of the General Assembly of the State of Illinois to
reasonably regulate abortion in conformance with the decision of the United
State Supreme Court of January 22, 1973. Without in any way restricting the right
of privacy of a woman or the right of a woman to an abortion under those de-.
cisions, the General Assembly of the State of Illinois do solemnly declare and
find in reaffirmation of the longstanding policy of this State, that the unborn child
is a human being from the time of conception and is therefore, a legal person
for purposes of the unborn child's right to life and is entitled to the right to
life from conception under the laws and Constitution of this State. Further, the
General Assembly finds and declares that long-standing policy of this State to
protect the right to life of the unborn child from conception by prohibiting
abortion unless necessary to preserve the life of the mother is impermissible only
because of the decisions of the United States Supreme Court and that, therefore,
if those decisions of the United States Supreme Court are ever reversed or modified or the United States Constitution is amended to allow protection of the unborn
then the former policy of this State to prohibit abortions unless necessary for the
preservation of the mother's life shall be reinstated.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 81-21 to 81-33 (1975).
Under this legislative finding, the nonviable fetus ex utero is a legal person
entitled to all of the rights and protections of other legal persons. Consequently any
experimentation involving the nonviable fetus ex utero in Illinois must be for the
benefit of that particular fetus or at least have no discernible risk for that fetus. A
three-judge federal court has granted a temporary injunction against enforcement
of this entire act. Wynn v. Scott, No. 75C-3975 (N.D. Ill., filed Dec. 2, 1976)
Long v. Scott, No. 75C-3981 (N.D. Ill. filed Dec. 2, 1976).
74. 45 C.F.R. § 46.209 (1976).
75. Id.
76. Id. § 46.203(e).
77. See P. RAMsEY, supra note 42, at 34.
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ex utero,' but which up to now has been known by the law, and I
think by society generally, as an infant, however premature. '78
In his paper to the National Commission, Professor Capron stated:
As we have seen, nonviable fetuses ex utero have been regarded
as persons under the common law of crimes, protected against
murder and assault; under statutory law a still greater burden
of care (than might be warranted by its "nonviability") may be
inposed, as in some abortion laws, and restrictions may be placed
on what can be done with it, as in the statutes governing what
Louisiana vividly denominates "the crime of human experimentation." The common law of torts and property, and the rules of
equity, also regard the nonviable fetus ex utero as a "person"
to be accorded the full protection of the law. Although its small
size and weight and general lack of development preclude such a
fetus from having any true independent existence, the fact of its
physical separation from its mother is sufficient to confer upon it
the presumption of such independence. 79
Thus, the nonviable fetus ex utero is a person under the law
is, indeed, a constitutional person"0 -. and should be included in
experimental protocol only on the same basis as are other persons.
Consequently those sections of the federal regulations involving children
should be applicable to the nonviable fetus ex utero.
78. COMMISSION'S REPORT, supra note 1, at 317. A three-judge federal court
interpreting a Minnesota statute recently discussed this question and declared that a
fetus who is "born alive and is capable of living independently of its mother . . .
becomes a person - protected by the usual constitutional rights." Hodgson v.
Anderson, 378 F. Supp. 1008, 1017 (D. Minn. 1974), appeal dismissed on other
grounds sub noam., Spannaus v. Hodgson, 420 U.S. 903 (1975), partially aff'd and
partially rev'd on other grounds sub nom., Hodgson v. Lawson, 542 F.2d 1350 (8th
Cir. 1976). The statute was nonetheless found unconstitutional because of its declaration that during the second half of the fetus' gestation period (18-20 weeks) a fetus
was to be considered "potentially" viable. The District Court thought this created
a presumption of viability at the 20th week which it felt was not in accord with
the teaching of Roe v. Wade, 378 F. Supp. at 1016. However, Dr. Leon Kass recommended to the National Commission that "accurate evaluation of the viability of a
fetus in utero between 20 and 28 weeks gestational age is not possible; such a fetus
should be presumed viable if a heartbeat is audible using a stethoscope." COMMISSION'S
REPORT, supra note 1, at 40 Fed. Reg. 33,544 (1975). The Peel Report recommended
no research beyond the 20th week and defined viability for research purposes to begin
at 20 weeks. See P. RAMSEY, supra note 42, at 69. For a discussion of the concept
of viability, see Horan, Viability, Values and the Vast Cosmos, 22 CATH. LAW.
1 (1976).

79. Appendix, supra note 1, at 13-1 to 13-25 (footnote omitted). Professor
Capron then raised the question of whether such protection to the nonviable fetus
ex utero is wise, but he nonetheless cited and concurred with the authorities which
support the clear legal proposition that the nonviable fetus ex utero is a person
under the law.
80. Roe v. Wade is silent on the subject of fetal experimentation but by implication indicates that live birth confers personhood. See 410 U.S. at 156-62.
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VII.

A.

THE FETUS in

Utero

The Fetus in Utero and Pain

One of the most intriguing aspects of the papers delivered to
the National Commission concerns the fetus in utero and its ability
or inability to perceive pain. Dean Wilson refers to this in his legal
paper8 1 as do the ethicists Sisela Bok12 and Commissioner Karen
Lebacqz8" in their individual statements. To all three, the perception
or nonperception of pain was dispositive in some way of important
ethical issues at stake in fetal experimentation. For example, Commissioner Labacqz says that recommendation 6 regarding research on the
fetus during the abortion procedure and on the nonviable fetus ex utero
should be changed if the fetus is able to experience pain before the
twentieth week of gestation. 4
Consider the ramifications of such moral reasoning upon the treatment of the comatose patient. Since such a patient feels no pain, does
it necessarily follow that he or she can be experimented upon? Surely
no one would propose that we should be able to experiment as we
choose as long as the subjects are sedated. It is unclear, then, what
the fetus' receptivity to pain has to do with ethical principles. For
Commissioner Lebacqz, if the fetus does feel pain then the pain of the
dying subject may be minimized even if its lifespan is shortened.,
For Professor Wilson the receptivity of the fetus to pain is relevant
because of the brutalizing effect nontherapeutic experimentation would
have under such circumstances.8 6
The issue, however, is not pain but human rights. As the Supreme
Court of West Germany has said, "Where human life exists, human
dignity is present to it; it is not decisive that the bearer of this dignity
himself be conscious of it and know personally how to preserve it." '
The question of pain resurrects the fundamental issue of fetal experimentation in utero: the status of the fetus in utero. Ex utero and
alive, the fetus is a legal person. What is the fetus in utero either before
or after viability? The answer to this question may depend upon the
value our society places upon each individual human life and the time
81.
82.
83.
84.

Appendix, supra note 1, at 14-18.
Appendix, supra note 1, at 2-4, 2-7.
CoMmissioN's REPORT, supra note 1, at 321-22.
Id.
85. Id. at 85.
86. Appendix, supra note 1, at 14-18.

87. Judgment of February 25, 1975, 39 BVerfGE 1, reprinted in Gorby & Jones,
West German Abortion Decision: A Contrast to Roe v. Wade, 9 J. MAR. J. PRAc.

& PROC. 551, 641 (1976).
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when that value commences. If that value is a constitutional right
to life, then the legal question is when that constitutional right to
life vests. If the fetus in utero is a human being, then that human
is entitled to the same legal protection as any other. The rights created
by the United States Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade take precedence,
but when the maternal rights there defined are not involved and are
not in conflict with any rights asserted on behalf of the unborn, as is the
case when we are discussing fetal experimentation, then the teachings
of Roe v. Wade should not cloud our ability to analyze other legal
questions in a clear and concise manner.
B.

The Development of the Fetus In Utero

Justice Blackmun wrote in Roe v. Wade: "We need not resolve
the difficult question of when life begins. When those trained in the
respective disciplines of medicine, philosophy, and theology are unable
to arrive at any consensus, the judiciary, at this point in the development of man's knowledge, is not in a position to speculate as to the
answer." 8 However, he also stated that "we do not agree that, by
adopting one theory of life, [that individual human life begins at conception] Texas may override the rights of the pregnant woman that
,are at stake."89
This contrasts vividly with the holding of the West German
Supreme Court which found in its constitution an affirmative mandate
to protect human life at all stages of its development. Indeed, even
the dissent in the West German Court agreed that human life existed
in utero and disagreed only with the way in which the affimative constitutional mandate should be carried out.90
In September, 1948, the World Medical Association (of which
the United States is a founding member), after a lengthy discussion
of war crimes, based upon information from the United Nations War
Crimes Commission,9 ' adopted the Declaration of Geneva which says:
"I will maintain the utmost respect for human life, from the time of
conception; even under threat, I will not use my medical knowledge
contrary to the laws of humanity."9 2 This was followed in October
1949 by the International Code of Medical Ethics, which states that
"a doctor must always bear in mind the importance of preserving human
life from the time of conception until death."9 8 This was reaffirmed
88.
89.
90.
91.

410 U.S. 113,159 (1973).
Id. at 162.
See Gorby & Jones, supra note 87.
1 WoRLD MED. A. BULL. 22 (1949).

92. Id.

93. 2 WORLD MED. A. BULL. 5-34 (1950).
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by the World Medical Association in 1950 with the Declaration of
Oslo: "[T]he first moral imposed upon the doctor is respect for human
life as expressed in the clause of the Declaration of Geneva: 'I will
maintain the utmost respect for human life from the time of conception.' ""

Furthermore, on November 20, 1959, the General Assembly of
the United Nations unanimously adopted the Declaration of the Rights
of the Child. The Preamble to the declaration emphasized that children,
by reason of their physical and mental immaturity, need particular safeguards and care, including appropriate legal protection, both before
and after birth.9 5
Individual human life begins at conception (the union of the
mother's egg with the father's sperm) and is a progressive, ongoing
continuum until natural death. This is not merely a theory, as so many
have asserted. There is nothing theoretical about the beginning of
each human life; the unborn is actual, not potential. 96
From conception the child is a complex, dynamic, rapidly growing
individual. 9 7 By a natural and continuous process, the single fertilized
ovum will, over a period of approximately nine months, develop into
the trillions of cells of the newborn. The natural end of the individual
sperm and ovum is death unless fertilization occurs. In other words,
we are neither grown-up sperms nor are we grown-up eggs. At fertilization a new and unique individual is created which, although receiving one-half of its chromosomes from each parent, is really unlike
either.

98

The events that follow fertilization are self-generated by the new
individual under the guidance of his or her new and absolutely unique
hereditary plan. The new combination of chromosomes sets in motion
the individual's life, controlled by his or her own individual code
(genes) with its enormous library of information projected from the
94. Id.
95. U.N. OFFICE OF PUBLIC INFORMATION, EVERYMAN'S UNITED NATIONS 360

(8th ed. 1968) (a handbook of the activities and evolution of the U.N. during its first
twenty years, 1945-1965).
96. The leading textbooks on embryology all agree. See, e.g., texts cited in note
18 supra.
97. I gratefully acknowledge the work of Dr. Bart Heffernan and Dr. Thomas
W. Hilgers in compiling the material and in preparing the amicus curiae brief on
behalf of the unborn child in Roe v. Wade from which the following account of the
development of the unborn is taken. This brief was reprinted in 75 LANDMARK BRIEFS
AND ARGUMENTS

OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED

STATES:

CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW 381-488 (P. Kurland
JUSTICE (T. Hilgers & D.

& G. Casper eds. 1976). See also ABORTION AND SOCIAL
Horan eds. 1973).
98. See generally L.B. AREY, supra note 18; A. INGLEMAN-SUNDBERG & C.
WIRSEN, supra note 18; B.M. PATTEN, supra note 18; R. RUGH & L.B. SHErLEs,

supra note 13.
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past on the helix of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA). A single thread
of DNA from a human cell contains information equivalent to 600,000
printed pages with 500 words on a page, or a library of 1,000 volumes. 9
The stored knowledge at conception in the new individual's library of
instructions is fifty times more than that contained in the Encyclopedia Britanica. These unique and individual instructions are operative
throughout the individual's life and form a continuum of human existence even into succeeding generations.
The first month of life probably represents the most outstanding
biological achievement which any individual human life experiences.
The complexity of this early human life is so great that it is literally
beyond our comprehension, and it therefore demands our respect.
Sometimes, because we do not understand this process, we belittle it
without giving any thought to the dynamics of what is actually happening.
With the development of sophisticated radio immunoassay techniques, the diagnosis of pregnancy can be made within nine days after
fertilization and prior to implantation.'
Very shortly after conception
the prospective sex of the child can be determined. 10 Marcel and
Exchaquet observed contractions of the human heart in embryos as
early as two weeks after conception. By five weeks of age, tracings
exhibiting the classical elements of the adult electrocardiogram can be
0 2

obtained.1

The primitive skeletal system is completely developed by the end
of the sixth week 0 3 and the electroencephalogram has detected brain
waves as early as forty-three days. 04 During the sixth and seventh
weeks, the nerves and muscles begin working together for the first
time,' and the lips become sensitive to touch (the first area of the
body to do so), and when gently stroked, the child responds predictably.'
99. See generally R. HOUWINK, DATA: MIRRORS OF SCIENCE 104-90 (1970).
100. Kosasa, Early Detection of Implantation Using a Radioimmunoassay Specific
for Human Chorionic Gonadotropin, 36 J. CLINICAL ENDOCRINOLOGY & METABOLISM

622 (1973).
101. R. RUGH & L.B.

SHETTLES,

supra note 13.

102. Marcel & Exchaquet, L'electrocardiograinme du Foetus Human avec un
cas de Double Rythme Auriculaire Verifie, 13 ARCH. MAL. CouER 504 (1938).
103. See, e.g., L.B. AREY, supra note 18, at 55; B.M. PATTEN, supra note 18, at 39.
104. Still, Note in 59 J. WASH. ACAD. ScI. 46 (1969).
105. AREY, supra note 18, at 55.

106. See generally G.L.
D.

FLANAGAN, THE FIRST NINE MONTHS OF LIFE (1962);
HOOKER, EARLY HUMAN FETAL BEHAVIOR WITH A PRELIMINARY NOTE ON DOUBLE

SIMULTANEOUS FETAL STIMULATION (1954); D. HOOKER, THE ORIGIN OF OVERT
BEHAVIOR (1944); D. HOOKER, THE PRENATAL ORIGIN OF BEHAVIOR (1952).
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By the seventh week of life, the child's shape and form is unmistakably human. The child now has all the internal organs of the
adult ;1"' the stomach produces digestive juices, the liver manufactures
red blood cells, and the kidney eliminates uric acid from the blood.'
The child's arms are still very short, but hands, fingers, and thumbs
are recognizable and the legs have knees, ankles, and toes. 0 9 From this
point in development, until age twenty-five to twenty-seven years, when
full growth and development is complete, the only major changes will
be in the size and sophistication of functioning parts."'
Fingerprints begin to develop at eight weeks and will remain a
unique feature of the individual for the duration of a lifetime."' The
eyelids and palms of the hands become sensitive to touch at about
eight-and-one-half weeks. At this point, if the eyelids are touched, the
child squints; if the palm is touched, the fingers close into a small fist." 2
Sex hormones, especially estrogens and androgens, have been identified
as early as nine weeks."' At ten weeks, somatotrophic hormone
(growth hormone) is detectable," 4 and at ten-and-one-half weeks, the
thyroid and adrenal glands have begun to function. 5 At ten weeks it
is possible to detect the child's heartbeat with the use of ultrasonic
techniques which are used routinely by obstetricians."'
By the end of the third month, the unborn child has become very
active. The child can now kick its legs, turn its feet, curl and fan its
toes, make a fist, move its thumb, bend its wrist, turn its head, squint,
frown, open its mouth, and press its lips tightly together." 7 The child
is able to swallow and drink the surrounding amniotic fluid. Inhaling
and exhaling respiratory movements begin to move fluid in and out
107. G.L.
108. G.L.

FLANAGAN,
FLANAGAN,

supra note 103; B.M. PATTEN, supra note 18, at 39.
supra note 103; A. GESELL, THE EMBRYOLOGY OF BEHAVIOR

(1945).
109. G.L. FLANAGAN, supra note 103; B.M. PATTEN, supra note 18, at 39.
110. L.B. AREY, supra note 18, at 55; E. POTTER, PATHOLOGY OF THE FETUS AND
INFANT (3d ed. 1975).
111. A. GESELL, supra note 105; Miller, Dermal Ridge Patterns: Techniques for
Their Study in Human Fetuses, 73 J. PEDIATRICS 614 (1968).
112. See G.L. FLANAGAN, supra note 103; D. HOOKER, EARLY HUMAN FETAL
BEHAVIOR, supra note 103; D. HOOKER, THE ORIGIN OF OVERT BEHAVIOR, supra note
103; D. HOOKER, THE PRENATAL ORIGIN OF BEHAVIOR, supra note 103.
113. Abramovich, The Importance of Foetal Physiology and Endocrinology in
Obstetrics, MED.

3.

AUSTL., Aug. 23, 1969, at 408 (1969).

114. Id.
115. Id.; Shephard, Onset of Function in the Human Fetal Thyroid: Biochemical
and Radioantographic Studies from Organ Culture, 27 J. CLINICAL ENDOCRINOLOGY
& METABOLISM 945 (1967).

116. Barton, Evaluation of the Doppler Shift Principle as a Diagnostic Aid in
Obstetrics, 102 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 563 (1968).
117. D. HOOKER, THE PRENATAL ORIGIN OF BEHAVIOR, supra note 103.
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of its lungs. Thumbsucking is first noted at this age."' The child
has vocal chords and fingernails and is able to urinate." 9
During the fourth month of life the unborn child grows very
rapidly. Weight increases six times over and the child grows eight
to ten inches in length.' 20 In the fifth month (sixteen to twenty weeks),
the unborn child will become one foot tall and weigh approximately one
pound. Hair begins to grow on its head; eyebrows and a fringe of
eyelashes appear. The child sleeps and wakes just as it will after birth..'
and may even be aroused from sleep by external vibrations. 22 The
skeleton hardens and the muscles become stronger. Finally, the mother
perceives the child's activities.
Certainly the fetus is in control of its own environment during
the course of its development in the womb. 12 The fetus is not a passive,
dependent, nerveless, fragile vegetable, as tradition has held, but a
young human being, dynamic, plastic and resilient.
The fetus is aware of pain and discomfort and responds with
violent movement to needle puncture and the intramuscular or intraperitoneal injection of cold or hypertonic solutions. Although we would
accept that these stimuli are painful for adults, children, and, judging
from its reaction, for the neonate, we are not entitled to assert that the
fetus feels pain. Nevertheless, it is the purposeful avoidance of dis124
comfort which determines fetal position in utero.
The fetus is responsible for the regulation of the amniotic fluid
volume. The fetus does not need kidneys to regulate body water and
electrolytes, since the placenta handles this task; but the fetus does
118. G.L. FLANAGAN, THE FIRST NINE MONTHS OF LIFE,
HOOKER, THE PRENATAL ORIGIN OF BEHAVIOR, supra note 103.

119. L.B. AREY, supra note
PATTEN, supra note 18, at 39.

18, at 55; G.L.

FLANAGAN,

supra note 103; D.

supra note 103; B.M.

It should be pointed out at this time that a woman normally does not begin
suspecting she is pregnant until the first missed menstrual period. However, it is
unusual for a woman to suspect strongly that she is pregnant until sometime after

that, generally not until the time of the second missed menstrual period. Widely
used pregnancy tests usually do not become positive until four weeks after conception.
As a result, the pregnancy is well under way, often into the sixth to eighth week,
before a woman even begins to realize that she is pregnant. If she is to seek an
abortion at that time it usually requires some additional delay as she thinks through
her position and finds a physician willing to perform the operation. By that time the
humanity of the unborn child is unquestionable even to the untrained observer.
120. Hellman, Growth and Development of the Human Fetus Prior to the Twentieth Week of Gestation, 103 AMER. J. OBSTETRICS GYNECOLOGY 789 (1969).
121. Petre-Quaden, Sleep in Pregnancy: Evidence of Foetal-Sleep Characteristics,

4 J.
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ScI. 600 (1967).

122. G.L. FLANAGAN, supra note 103.
123. Liley, The Foetus in Control of His Environment, in
jUSTIcE 27-36 (T. Hilgers & D. Horan eds. 1972).
124. Id.
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need kidneys for maintenance of amniotic fluid volume. A patent and
25
functional gastro-intestinal tract is also required.
Fetal swallowing regulates amniotic fluid volume; it is not clear
what regulates fetal swallowing. Whereas fetal urination does not
contribute to fetal hydration, fetal swallowing does appear to contribute
to fetal nutrition, for babies who cannot swallow amniotic fluid (e.g.,
those with esophageal or duodenal atresia) are smaller at maturity than
normal babies.12' This evidence raises the possibility that fetal hunger
in fact regulates fetal swallowing.
Another type of fetal control and perhaps its most dazzling achievement is the fetus' command of a parabiotic situation. 12 In an out-bred
population, mother and fetus are inevitably immunological foreigners;
the baby is immunologically foreign to the mother just as the frequently
rejected heart transplant is immunologically foreign to the recipient. Yet
for successful pregnancy they must be made to accept each other as mutual homografts. Early explanation of this mutual acceptance attempted
to give credit to the mother. However, the uterus is certainly not an
immunologically privileged site, and the conceptus can grow in sites
other than the uterus - for instance, the tube or peritoneum. Thus, it
now appears that it is a component of the fetus which ensures the
immunological success of pregnancy. This component is the trophoblast,
which not only forms a continuous barrier between the circulations
of mother and fetus but also fails to express any transplantation antigens itself. The trophoblast acts as an immunological barrier or buffer
between mother and fetus so that each is completely indifferent not
only to the transplantation antigen of the other but even to a specific
sensitivity of the other against his own antigens.
It has been shown that flashing lights applied to the maternal
abdominal wall produce fluctuations in the fetal heart rate. 28 A sudden
noise in a quiet room startles the fetus lined up under an image intensifier. The fetus drinks more amniotic fluid if it is sweetened and
swallows very little if the amniotic fluid is made bitter. It even appears
inescapable that the normal onset of labor is triggered by mechanisms
controlled by the fetus. 29
Because the medicine of adults preceded the medicine of the infant,
neonate and fetus, a tendency has developed in all fields from surgery
to psychiatry to study adult life first and then work backwards. Since
the standard of all that is normal in medicine has been the fit young
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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adult male, any function in the baby which differs from this standard
has been considered as immaturity, and by inference, inferiority. The
net effect has been to consider the fetus and neonate as a poorly functioning adult rather than as a splendidly functioning baby.
There is little question that a major thrust of medicine in the
last fifteen years has been to treat the unborn child as an independent
patient in its own right. We have now made great strides in the diagnosis and the treatment of diseases of the unborn. The first major
development in this regard was accomplished by Doctor Sir William
Liley, who first performed an intrauterine transfusion to treat an
infant afflicted with Rh disease.180 This marked the beginning of the
new science of fetology, the study of the unborn, and Doctor Liley is
generally considered to be the "father of fetology." Since that time
a number of other advances have been made, the most dramatic of
which has been the direct surgical operation on the unborn. A pioneer
in this field, Doctor Stanley Aasensio, of the University of Puerto
Rico School of Medicine, has actually taken the fetus out of the mother's
womb, performed the operation, and then placed him back into the
181
womb only to be later delivered as a healthy, normal child.
A most appropriate comment regarding the fetus in utero was
written by Doctor Sir William Liley:
Not all of us will live to be old, but we were each once a fetus.
We had some engaging qualities which unfortunately we lost as
we grew older. We were supple and physically active. We were
not prone to disc lesions and were not obese. Our most depraved
vice was thumbsucking, and the worst consequence of drinking
liquor was hiccups. We ruled our mothers with a serene efficiency
which our fathers could not hope to emulate. Our main handicap
in a world of adults was that we were small, naked, nameless and
voiceless. But surely if any of us count for
anything now, we
8 2
counted for something before we were born.'

The study of the unborn is still a relatively new science and yet
in its short existence it has put into perspective what the obstetrician
has known for years; when working with a pregnant woman, there are
two patients involved. Research over the past fifteen to twenty years
has proven that the child within its mother is a distinct individual in
need of the most diligent study and care. Both patients, mother and
child, require and challenge the fullest expertise of our medical art.
Consequently, no experimentation should be allowed in utero from the
130. See Rorvik, The Brave New World of the Unborn, LooK, Nov. 4, 1969, at 76.
131. Id. at 74.
132. Liley, supra note 120.
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time of conception onward unless such experimentation is for the health
needs of mother and child.

VIII. THE

REGULATORY SCHEME AND NORMATIVE ETHICS

Although the regulations of HEW are an important step in the
control of fetal experimentation, they are not sufficient. They contain
many pitfalls, as we have seen, and are limited in scope to research
supported by grants from HEW. Thus, there is a continuing need
for state statutory and regulatory schemes.
Regulation is especially critical due to the disregard for human
safety and dignity manifested by many researchers. Beginning in 1966,
the National Institutes of Health (NIH), the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and HEW began issuing regulations governing experimentation with human subjects. Although investigators have complained about this "interference," a recent study indicated, "[o]n the
basis of our results I would argue that there is indeed inadequate ethical
concern among biomedical investigators, that it is reflected in excessively risky procedures and that better internal and external controls are
essential."' 33
Although no such records are specifically maintained, NIH says
3
that about one-third of its approved projects involve human subjects.
Concern that these human subjects exercise an informed consent has
been heightened by the revelations in recent years of experiments conducted without adequate informed consent of the subject and, indeed,
in some instances without any knowledge at all on the part of the human
subjects involved. For example, "[i] n the 1960's two respected cancer
investigators who were studying the immune response to malignancies
injected live cancer cells into a number of geriatric patients at the
Jewish Hospital and Medical Center of Brooklyn without first obtaining
the patients' informed consent."'
In another famous case, a leading virologist exposed severely retarded children to hepatitis virus. 36 One of the most well-known incidents involves the syphilis experiments in Tuskegee, Alabama. As
late as 1945, when penicillin had become available as a safe and
effective cure of syphilis, participants were maintained on observation
without being given the penicillin, and presumably some men died of
7
the disease who could have been cured.1
133. Barber, The Ethics of Experimentationwith Human Subjects, 234
Am. Feb., 1976, at 25 (1976).

SCIENTIFIC

134. Id.

135. Id. at 26.
136. Id.

137. Id.
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A pediatric neurosurgeon recently told this author that he had
been requested by his teaching medical institution to undertake a controlled study which, in his opinion, was unethical. This study consisted
of withholding certain kinds of treatment from defective newborns
whose long term health outlook would then be compared to the treated
group. He refused. Another example of experimentation conducted
without the participants' consent concerns the Army's disclosure
eighteen years after the fact that "volunteer" participants in a chemical
warfare program had unknowingly consumed LSD.'
One of the
participants in this experimental program had committed suicide, and
it was only the persistence of his family which brought this nonconsensual experimentation to light.
In their carefully controlled study of attitudes of researchers,
Barber and his group concluded that "whereas the majority of the
investigators were what we called 'strict' with regard to balancing
risks against benefits, a significant minority were 'permissive,' that is
they were much more willing to accept an unsatisfactory risk-benefit
ratio."1 9 If this finding is true with regard to experimentation on
adults and children, one can imagine what would be the corresponding
result of such a survey where the experimentation involved unborn
children destined for abortion or the nonviable fetus ex utero. Obviously, the ethically permissive researcher as described by Barber
would find little in the way of ethical concerns to deter him in his
research protocols. How would such a permissive research type interpret the very significant words "minimal risk" as used in the regulations ?
It becomes even clearer that regulatory control of research involving the fetus is necessary when one considers this significant finding
from Barber's study:
How does it happen that the treatment of human subjects is sometimes less than ethical, even in some of the most respected university-hospital centers? We think the abuses can be traced to
defects in the training of physicians and in the screening and
monitoring of research by review committees, and also to a fundamental tension between investigation and therapy. We have data
bearing on each of these causative factors.
It is in medical school that the profession's central and most
serious concerns are presumably given time and place and that
its basic knowledge and values are instilled. Yet the evidence from
our interviews shows that there is not much training in research
ethics in medical school. Of the more than 300 investigators who
138. Chicago Tribune, Sept 4, 1975, at 3.
139. Barber, supra note 130, at 27.
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responded to questions in this area, only 13 percent reported they
had been exposed in medical school to part of a course, a seminar
or even a single lecture devoted to the ethical issues involved in
experimentation with human subjects; only one respondent said
he had taken an entire course dealing with the issues. Another 13
percent reported that the subject had come to their attention when,
as students, they did practice procedures on one another; for 24
percent it was in the course of experiments with animals; 34 percent remembered discussion of ethical issues in specific research
projects. One or more of these learning experiences were reported
by 43 percent of the respondents - but the remaining 57 percent
reported not a single such experience. The figures were about the
same whether the investigators were graduates of elite U.S. medical
schools, other U.S. schools or foreign schools. The figures were
a little better, however, for those who had graduated since 1950
than for older investigators. 4 °
Such findings raise the question of what kind of normative ethics
are being referred to in the HEW regulations which require the submission of protocols to Ethical Advisory Boards for ethical review.
The regulations approach the subject of fetal experimentation as though
ethical norms existed with which all agreed, or as though a broad
consensus in the community still prevailed. That consensus may still
exist with respect to most medical-ethical questions where nondefective
born children, or adults not terminally ill are concerned; however, where
the unborn are concerned and where abortion is involved, to speak of
ethical norms is nonsense.
Joseph Fletcher stated the issue best: "The core question at stake
in the ethics of fetal research is whether a fetus is a person. 1 1' He
concluded that the fetus is not a person and only has value when it is
wanted. His ethical appraisal leads him to five conclusions:
(1) It is justifiable, depending on the clinical situation and the
design, to make any use of abortuses or dead fetuses whole, tissues, or uterine materials - whether from voluntary or therapeutic abortions, and with or without maternal
consent.
(2) It is justifiable, depending on the clinical situation and the
design, to make any use of live fetuses ex utero, previable or
viable, if survival is not purposed or wanted, and if there
is maternal consent.
(3) It is justifiable, depending on the clinical situation and the
design, to make any use of live fetuses in utero, if survival is
not purposed or wanted, and if there is maternal consent.
140. Id. at 29.
141. Fletcher, Fetal Research: An Ethical Appraisal, in Appendix, supra note 1,
at 3-3.
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(4) It is justifiable, depending on the clinical situation and the
design, to use live fetuses in utero even if survival is intended,
if there is no substantial risk to the fetus, and if there is both
maternal and spouse-paternal consent.
(5) As a fifth finding we may add the point already discussed,
that regulations by the public authority are unethical if the
reasons for them, the ethics they are rested upon, are not
disclosed fully and frankly.' 4 2
When the regulations refer to ethics and ethical norms, are the
ethics of Fletcher those to which they refer? Presumably not, since
the regulations have rejected such thinking. But who is to say whether
individual members of the Ethical Advisory Boards or the review
boards will not follow the ethical norms as set forth by Fletcher? This
is not a farfetched concern; the ethical norms about which Fletcher
speaks have had a profound effect upon the legalization of abortion
143
and are leading to the legalization of infanticide and euthanasia.
The obvious purpose of Fletcher's last conclusion, that public
regulations are unethical if the ethics supporting them are not disclosed fully and frankly, is to give to investigators who want to avoid
the regulations an ethical rationale for doing so. Similar reasoning
supported the abortionists who flaunted the law when abortion was
illegal. With Fletcher as their guide, researchers may well flaunt these
governmental regulations, even when applicable, "for the good of mankind."
Clearly, then, research on the unborn requires closer regulation.
Appendix A sets forth a model state statutory scheme for the protection of human subjects, including the unborn. 4 4 Obviously, such a
proposed piece of legislation must be studied carefully before being
proposed for adoption in a particular state. It is intended to be merely
a starting point for states interested in legislation to regulate the conduct of clinical research with human subjects, including the unborn.
Nevertheless, the statute does attempt to obviate most of the pitfalls
of the federal regulations outlined in this article, including the problems
involved in legislating only in the area of fetal experimentation. Adopting such a statutory scheme would go far toward resolving the difficult and troublesome issues presented by fetal experimentation. However, it is my belief that only a constitutional amendment which
restores the constitutional right to life to the unborn will ultimately
solve all of these problems.
142. Id. at 3-11.
143. J. FLETCHER, Ethics and Euthanasia, in To LIVE AND TO DIE:
AND How 113-22 (1973). See also Duff & Campbell, supra note 51.

WHEN, WHY

144. I have used a model piece of legislation previously introduced into the Illinois
Assembly but modified to fit my objections.
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APPENDIX A
AN ACT to regulate the conduct of clinical research with human subjects, including the unborn.
Be it enacted by the People of the State of -,
represented in the
General Assembly:
Section 1. This Act may be referred to and cited as the ".
Clinical
Research Act."
Section 2. The conduct of clinical research in the State of
is declared
to affect the public health, safety, and welfare. It is further declared that the purpose
of this Act is to safeguard the health and welfare of human subjects including the
unborn and to assure the continued excellence of clinical research in -.....................
Further, it is the intent of the legislature of the State of--------......
that no
research be conducted or supported in ..-----------......-------which fails to treat all
humans, including the unborn, with proper care and dignity. This Act shall be liberally
construed to carry out these purposes.
Section 3. This Act applies to all clinical research conducted in the State
of
and to all persons conducting or participating in such research,
but this Act does not apply to professional medical or dental practice by any one
licensed under the laws of the State, in which disease in a particular, individual
patient is investigated and treatment initiated solely with the view of preventing,
arresting, or curing the disease in that patient.
Section 4. For the purposes of this Act, unless the context otherwise requires, the
terms specified in Section 4.01 through 4.13 have the meanings ascribed to them in
those Sections.
Section 4.01. "Clinical Research" means any biomedical or behavioral research
involving human subjects, including the unborn, conducted according to a formal procedure. The term is to be construed liberally to embrace research concerning all physiological processes in man and includes research involving human in vitro fertilization.
Section 4.02. "Subject at risk" or "subject" means any individual who may be
exposed to the possibility of injury, including physical, psychological, or social injury,
as a consequence of participation as a subject in any research, development, or related
activity which departs from the application of those established and accepted methods
necessary to meet his needs, or which increases the ordinary risks of daily life, including the recognized risks inherent in a chosen occupation or field of service.
Section 4.03. "Informed consent" means the knowing consent of an individual or
his legally authorized representative, so situated as to be able .to exercise free power
of choice without undue inducement or any element of force, fraud, deceit, duress, or
other form of constraint or coercion. The basic elements of information necessary to
such consent include:
(1) A fair explanation of the procedures to be followed, and their purposes,
including identification of any procedures which are experimental;
(2) a description of any attendant discomforts and risks reasonably to be expected;
(3) a description of any benefits reasonably to be expected;
(4) a disclosure of any appropriate alternative procedures that might be advantageous for the subject;
(5) an offer to answer any inquiries concerning the procedures; and
(6) an instruction that the person is free to withdraw his consent and to discontinue participation in the project or activity at any time without prejudice to
the subject.
Section 4.04. "Research Review Committee" or "Committee" means an institutional review committee, board or similar body, the structure and function of which
has been accepted by the Department as being consistent with generally established
rules and regulations for conducting scientific research.
Section 4.05. "Pregnancy" encompasses the period of time from confirmation of
conception until expulsion or extraction of the fetus.
Section 4.06. "Fetus" means the product of conception from the time of conception until a determination is made, following expulsion or extraction of the fetus,
that it is viable.
Section 4.07. "Viable" as it pertains to the fetus means being able, after either
spontaneous or induced delivery, including abortion, to survive, if given the benefit of
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available medical therapy, to the point of independently maintaining heartbeat and
respiration.
Section 4.08. "Nonviable fetus" means a fetus ex utero which, although living, is
not viable.
Section 4.09. "Live fetus" means a fetus ex utero which exhibits either heartbeat,
spontaneous respiratory activity, spontaneous movement of voluntary muscles, or
pulsation of the umbilical cord (if still attached).
Section 4.10. "In vitro fertilization" means any fertilization of human ova which
occurs outside the body of a female, either through admixture of donor human sperm
and ova or by any other means.
Section 4.11. "Person" means any individual, firm, partnership, association, State
or local governmental agency, corporation, whether organized for profit or not, or
any form of business, charitable, or education enterprise.
Section 4.12. "Department" means the Department of Public Health of the
State of
Section 4.13. "Institution" means any public or private organization or agency,
including State and local government agencies.
Section 4.14. "Non-therapeutic clinical research or experimentation" means any
biomedical or behavioral research involving human subjects including the unborn conducted according to a formal procedure but not for the particular benefit of the
subjects involved.
Section 5. Clinical Research may be conducted in the State of
only if:
(a) a Committee of the institution has reviewed and approved such activity, and
the institution has submitted to the Department a certification of such review and
approval, in accordance with the requirements of this Section.
(b) this review shall determine whether the subjects will be placed at risk, and if
risk is involved, whether:
(1) the risks to the subject are so outweighed by the sum of the benefit to the
subject and the importance of the knowledge to be gained as to warrant a decision
to allow the subject to accept those risks;
(2) the rights and welfare of any such subjects will be adequately protected;
(3) legally effective informed consent will be obtained by adequate and appropriate methods in accordance with the provisions of Section 6; and
(4) the conduct of the activity will be reviewed at timely intervals.
(e) approval of research involving human subjects at risk shall not be given to
an individual unless he is affiliated with or sponsored by an institution which can and
does assume responsibility for the subjects involved.
Section 6. The actual procedure utilized in obtaining legally effective informed

consent and the basis for Committee determinations that the procedures are adequate
and appropriate shall be fully documented. The documentation of consent will employ

one of the following three forms:

(a) Provision of a written consent document embodying all of the basic elements

of informed consent. This may be read to the subject or to his legally authorized
representative, but in any event he or his legally authorized representative must be
given adequate opportunity to read it. This document is to be signed by the subject
or his legally authorized representative. Sample copies of the consent form as approved
by the Committee are to be retained in its records.

(b) Provision of a "short form" written consent document indicating that the
basic elements of informed consent have been presented orally to the subject or his
legally authorized representative. Written summaries of what is to be said to the
patient are to be approved by the Committee. The short form is to be signed by the
subject or his legally authorized representative and by an auditor witness to the oral
presentation and to the subject's signature. A copy of the approved summary, annotated to show any additions, is to be signed by its persons officially obtaining the consent and by the auditor witness. Sample copies of the consent form and of the summaries as approved by the Committee are to be retained in its records.

Section 7. Minors, or mentally incompetent persons may be used as subjects only if:
(a) the nature of the investigation is such that adults or mentally competent persons would not be suitable subjects, and
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(b) consent, in writing, is given by both parents or legal guardian of the subject,
under circumstances in which a prudent adult would reasonably be expected to volunteer
himself as a subject, and there is no discernible risk to the minor child or incompetent.
(c) consent to research not conducted in the interest of a particular incompetent
or minor child, may be granted only by a court in addition to the written consent of
both parents. Such consent shall be granted only where there are no discernible risks
to the incompetent or minor child.
Section 8. Any other provision of this act notwithstanding:
(a) No clinical research activity involving fetuses or pregnant women shall be
conducted unless:
(1) Appropriate studies on animals and nonpregnant individuals have been
completed;
(2) Except where the purpose of the activity is to meet the health needs of the
particular fetus, there is no discernible risk to the fetus and, in all cases, is the least
possible risk for achieving the objectives of the activity;
(3) Individuals engaged in the activity will have no part in: (i) Any decisions
as to the timing, method, and procedures used to terminate the pregnancy, and (ii)
determining the viability of the fetus at the termination of the pregnancy; and
(4) No procedural changes which may cause greater than minimal risk to the
fetus or the pregnant woman will be introduced into the procedure for terminating
the pregnancy solely in the interest of the activity.
(b) No inducements, monetary or otherwise, may be offered to terminate pregnancy for purposes of the activity.
(c) No consent to involve a pregnant woman or a fetus as a subject in clinical
research activity shall be valid unless the persons giving consent have been fully informed as provided in Section 6.
Section 9. In addition to other provisions of this Act:
(a) No pregnant woman may be involved as a subject in any clinical research
activity unless: (1) The purpose of the activity is to meet the health needs of the
mother and the fetus will be placed at risk only to the minimum extent necessary to
meet such needs, or (2) the risk to the fetus is minimal.
(b) An activity permitted under paragraph (a) of this Section may be conducted
only if the mother and father are legally competent and have given their informed
consent after having been fully informed regarding possible impact on the fetus, except
that the father's informed consent need not be secured if: (1) The purpose of the
activity is to meet the health needs of the mother; (2) his identity or whereabouts
cannot reasonably be ascertained; (3) he is not reasonably available; or (4) the
pregnancy resulted from rape.
Section 10. In addition to other provisions of this Act:
(a) No fetus in utero may be involved as a subject in any clinical research activity
unless the purpose of the activity is to meet the health needs of the particular fetus
and the fetus will be placed at risk only to the minimum extent necessary to meet such
needs or (2) there is no discernible risk to the fetus imposed by the research activity.
(b) An activity permitted under paragraph (a) of this Section may be conducted only if the mother and father are legally competent and have given their informed consent, except that the father's consent need not be secured if: (1) his
identity or whereabouts cannot reasonably be ascertained, (2) he is not reasonably
available, or (3) the pregnancy resulted from rape.
Section 11. In addition to other provisions of this Act:
(a) No live fetus ex utero may be involved as a subject in any clinical research
activity unless the purpose of the activity is to meet the health needs of the particular fetus and the fetus will be placed at risk only to the minimum extent necessary
to meet such needs.
(b) In the event the live fetus ex utero is found to be viable, it may be included
as a subject in the activity only to the extent permitted by and in accordance with the
requirements of this Act pertaining to minors.
(c) An activity permitted under paragraph (a) or (b) of this Section may be
conducted only if the mother and father are legally competent and have given their
informed consent, except that the father's informed consent need not be secured if:
(1) his identity or whereabouts cannot reasonably be ascertained, (2) he is not
reasonably available, or (3) the pregnancy resulted from rape.
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Section 12. Clinical research activities involving a dead fetus, mascerated fetal
material, or cells, tissue, or organs excised from a dead fetus shall be conducted only
in accordance with rules and regulations of the Department except as otherwise
directed by State or local laws.
Section 13. No clinical research activity involving human in vitro fertilization
shall be conducted unless there is a reasonable degree of medical certainty that the
products of such in vitro fertilization can survive to maturity without unreasonable
risk of harm.
S~ction 14. Each Research Review Committee shall maintain full records of its
proceedings and deliberations, and of all protocols, proposals, reports, consent forms,
and other papers submitted to it concerning clinical research conducted in Illinois.
Each Research Review Committee shall complete a form prescribed and furnished by
the Department at the end of each calendar quarter. Such form shall include, but
not be limited to the following information concerning any clinical research conducted
in the State of Illinois:
(a) the name of the person conducting the research,
(b) the title and purpose of the research, and
(c) the location of the investigation; provided, however, that no filing shall be
required hereunder for clinical research for which a separate filing is required under
Section - - - of the
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, as now or
hereafter amended. Records of the Research Review Committee shall be open to inspection by qualified persons in the Department at all reasonable times. No person
qualified to inspect these records shall communicate orally or in writing, to or for any
other person, or make available for public inspection matters that are:
(a) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute;
(b) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person
and privileged or confidential; or
(c) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would
constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.
Section 15. The conduct by any person of clinical research not approved in accordance with this Act is declared a nuisance inimical to the public health. The Director
of the Department, the Attorney General of the State of
, the
State's Attorney of any county in the State, or any resident citizen may maintain
an action in the name of the people of the State of

for an injunc-

tion in any court of competent jurisdiction to enjoin the conduct of any such unapproved clinical research until compliance with the provisions of this Act has been
obtained. In case of violation of any injunction issued under the provisions of this
Section, the court or any judge thereof, may summarily try and punish the offender
for contempt of court.
Section 16. Any other provision of this Act notwithstanding, any child, whether
born or unborn, injured in non-therapeutic clinical research or experimentation, shall
have a cause of action in strict tort liability for damages against those persons having
charge of such non-therapeutic clinical research or experimentation or their employers,
any consent to such non-therapeutic clinical research or experimentation by parents or
guardians notwithstanding.
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